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The Hungarian National Defense 
during the German Wars 1030-1052* 
The young Hungarian Kingdom and the not much elder Holy Roman Empire's 
armed conflicts are consistent parts of our medieval history. During this time the 
monarchs often changed, though there were long periods of peace, as well. The 
German Empire and the opponent Hungarian defense caused these events. I will 
only refer to the essential diplomatic movements during my essay. I do not en-
deavor to mention all the details of the battles. Detailed descriptions can be found 
in the writings of many specialists.11 would only like to answer whether military 
or other factors facilitated the Hungarian triumph and how these elements ap-
pear in the written sources. I stand by what I have previously said; we need to 
know all the archeological details and especially the history of the climate. Fur-
thermore, I used contemporary Hungarian and German chronicles and annals. 
According to the Annals of Salzburg, the Hungarians and the Kabars were 
fighting in the vicinity of Vienna since 881, so they had extensive knowledge of 
the local Carpathian basin before they tried to occupy the country.2 Until 955 the 
Hungarian offensive corps were the ones who most often passed through this 
country. The Eastern Frank State tried to stop them only once, in the summer of 
907, without any success.3 The next offensive of the German Empire was in 1030 
after 123 years of peace. Two Christian monarchies opposed; the difference was 
* This study was supported by the Bolyai János Research Fellowship. Translated by Noé-
mi Tóth. 
1 The most detailed description is to be found in J. Doberi Breit (Bánlaky), A magyar nem-
zet hadtörténelme [The Hungarian nation's millitary history] Vol. 3. Budapest 1929; new 
and shorter version is to be found in Gy. Kristó, Háborúk és hadviselés az Árpádok 
korában. [Wars and warefare during the Árpád period] Szeged 2003, 73-80. A few bat-
tles and compaignes are in A. F. Gombos, Szent István király halálának kilencszázadik 
évfordulóján. [On King Saint Stephen death's nine hundred anniversary] Vol. 2. Buda-
pest 1938, 109-132; L. Négyesi, „A ménfői csata," [The battle of Ménfő] Hadtörténelmi 
Közlemények 107: 3 (1994), 136-146. 
2 A. F. Gombos, Catalogus Fontium Históriáé Hungaricae. 3 vols. Budapestini 1937-1938,1: 
3 Referring to Kristó Gyula, with this win the enemy accepted the territory loss caused 
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political not ideological. In 1024 a new dynasty ascended the throne with new 
expansion plans. Conrad II (1024-1039) overthrew the doge of Venice's - the 
Hungarian king Steven's brother in law - dominion and in the same year got the 
Bavarian duke's throne on behalf of the Hungarian king's son. He was within his 
rights to do this, because Imre - the Hungarian king's son - was originally a Ba-
varian duke on his mother's side. In 1027 Conrad's heir, Henry III (1039-1056) 
- that is, not Imre - obtained the head of the German province.4 The clash be-
tween the two empires was bound to happen. 
The offensive was taken in the summer of 1030 which is recorded by Wipo 
- Conrad II's court historian - in a surprisingly precise way: „many conflicts 
arose between the Pannons [sc. the Hungarians] and the Bavarians, but these 
were at the Bavarian's instigation. That is why the Hungarian king Stephen in-
vaded the Nordic land [sc. the Bavarian kingdom] several times and started to 
pillage. Emperor Conrad attacked the Hungarians with his huge army for this 
reason."5 The mutual boundary quarrels convince us that king Stephen was pre-
pared for the conflict. We do not have exact data from the line of offensive except 
for the fact that the emperor had fighting units near the River Fischa.6 Neither do 
we know which Hungarian contingents tried to stop the Bavarians. The Annals of 
Altaich gives us some information about the fact that the Hungarian military op-
erations started at the end of June or the beginning of July.7 Whipo's next infor-
mation is about the natural obstructions. "The emperor could not penetrate into 
the Hungarian kingdom because of the natural obstructions, but he revenged on 
the Hungarians by burning and looting in the frontiers and planned to come back 
in a more suitable time to accomplish what he previously started to do."8 From 
the chronicle of Hermann of Reichenau we know a long line of the German army 
reached the country. "Emperor Konrad - who had conflicts with the Hungarian 
King Stephen for a long time - overran the Pannons and as long as the swamps 
and rivers let him to do this destroyed everything in line of the River Rába."9 On 
the ground of these two data it is indisputable that the campaign stopped soon 
because of the natural obstructions by the eastern frontier. He was not able to 
reach the middle of the country. We know valuable details about the successful 
Hungarian response from the Annals of Altaich: "Konrad returned from Hun-
gary without any success because his army was starving and the Hungarians oc-
4 About the reasons of the Hungarian-German wars in Gombos, Szent István király, 109-
112; F. Makk, Magyar külpolitika (896-1196). [Hungarian foreign policy] Szeged 1996, 
63-64; Kristó, Háborúk és hadviselés, 73-74. 
5 Gombos, Catalogus Fontium Históriáé, nr. 2666. 
6 Gombos, Szent István király, 127. 
7 Emperor Conrad has spent the night in the abbey of Altaich on the birthday of Saint 
Alban - E. Oefele, Annales Altahenses Maiores. Scriptores Rerum Germanicarum in usum 
scholarum. Hannoverae 1891,18. - so the date must be around 21 June 1030. 
8 Gombos, Catalogus Fontium Históriáé, nr. 2666. 
9 Gombos, Catalogus Fontium Históriáé, nr. 1143. 
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cupied Vienna."10 First, I would like to mention the defense tactic of burning the 
land. That made it totally impossible to get new supplies from the occupied land. 
The Hungarian counterattack was a brilliant move, as well. However, it is not be-
lievable that the Austrian capital of today had a really good fortress at that time 
because Stephen's army conquered the town with their impetus, so to speak. Af-
ter the peace negotiations, the Germans endured a loss of territory but it is only 
mentioned in one of the records from 1043 in the Annals of Altaich.11 On the 
grounds of King Henry Ill's donation letter from 1051, Gombos proved that the 
Hungarians became occupied in two territory sectors, the alley of Lajta-Fischa 
and the Duna-Morva curve.12 He concluded that the Hungarian army conquered 
a bigger area that they finally got. We do not know any other details about the 
case because the German chroniclers do not mention it more because they tried to 
disguise the serious fiasco. However, we do not have any Hungarian reports on 
these movements either.13 The chroniclers who lived at the same time only men-
tion the defense: the natural obstructions, the ruin of the supply, the efficiency of 
fast counter-attack, and the inexpressible value of the knowledge of the local 
geography and climate. 
The later authorities are significantly better at keeping records because the 
Germans had success that they could be proud of. The Hungarian successes are 
also found in these authorities. This helps us to create an objective opinion about 
the case. In October of 1042, the expelled Hungarian king Peter - the previous 
enemy - has found a refuge in the court of Emperor Henry III. The Hungarian 
conflict for the throne came just at the right moment for the German king because 
he could expound his goals by seeming to be an arbiter.14 King Samuel Aba called 
on Henry through his ministers not to protect his rival, but the emperor refused. 
To emphasize his request, Aba ravaged the Bavarian and Carantanian frontiers in 
the spring of 1042. In July Henry III began a military expedition against the Hun-
garians. According to the Annals of Altaich, he conquered nine Hungarian cas-
tles, but only held them for a short time. These castles were owned by a duke of 
10 H. Wolfram has a new interpretation of the Annal of Altaich of the 1030 battle. A „Chon-
radus imperátor... Rediit autem de Ungaria sine militia et in nullo proficiens, inde quod exerci-
tus fame periclitabatur, et vienni ab Ungris capiebatur." Oefele, MGH SS. Rer. Germ. 18. 
His opinion is that the Hungarians did not occupy Vienna only catched the German 
corps near to Vienna because the word 'Vienni' is not in a subjective case. H. Wolfram, 
"II. Konrád magyarpolitikája." [King Conrad II's Hungarian policy] in L. Veszprémy, 
ed. Szent István és az államalapítás, Budapest 2002,514. It seems rational but not convinc-
ing because the Annal of Salzburg uses the same word for Vienna. 
11 Oefele, Annales Altahenses Maiores, 33. 
12 Gombos, Szent István király, 131. Miklós Kring has quoted another benefaction from 
this area. M. Kring, "Magyarország határai Szent István korában," [The Hungarian 
frontiners during Saint Stephen's dominion] Gombos, Szent István király, 2: 483. 
13 Gombos, Szent István király, 130-132; Gombos, Catalogus Fontium Históriáé, nr. 2666.; I. 
Szentpétery, Scriptores Rerum Hungaricarum, 2 vols. Budapestini 1937-1938. (hence-
forth: SRH) 2: 389-390. 
14 Makk, Magyar külpolitika, 72-73. 
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the Arpad House, probably by the later King Béla I (1060-1063). After the Ger-
man army left, Samuel Aba ousted the duke easily.15 Herman of Reichenau has 
also recorded this attack. "This autumn King Henry attacked the Pannons, occu-
pied Hamburg, Pozsony and the northern shore of the Danube River. As the 
southern shore and swamps protected him, he destroyed the country as far as the 
river Garam..."16 We do not know the exact names of these nine castles, but their 
lightning fast defeat shows us similar weaknesses as were previously seen in 
Vienna fortresses. 
We have detailed information about our defense in the notes from 1043. In 
August, Emperor Henry III marched with his army to the River Rábca. Referring 
to the Annals of Altaich, "they reviewed the army, prepared the war machines 
against the protective obstructions on the river and decided to attack tomorrow." 
The annals use the Latin word 'opus' that refers to the obstruction that was built 
by humans.17 The local annals use the word 'obstacula' which means the same.18 
The 'opus' from 1043 is the first written note about the Hungarian frontier de-
fense.19 In connection with this I need to mention the defense definition of the 
Hungarian word 'gyepű'. We suppose that the Hungarian words 'gyep' (grass, 
lawn) and 'gyepű' (grassy) have the same routes. The oldest meaning of the word 
is the deserted land, which separates the Hungarians from other people or sepa-
rates the Hungarian tribes from each other. During the eleventh century - when 
the frontier defense developed - the meaning has split. Since this time the word 
'gyepű' means artificial frontier defense. Unfortunately, we do not know exact de-
tails about the splitting process because we do not have contemporary Hungarian 
sources nor any foreign ones. We cannot find the Latin word 'indago' - which 
covers the exact word 'gyepű' - in the contemporary sources, just some similar 
references.20 Nevertheless, the Hungarian and German sources fit this proposal. 
We have another important point of view expressed by Breit. He emphasizes the 
fact that the contemporary frontier is not the same exact line, which is used 
now.21 This important point clearly explains the result of the conflict of August 
1043. We know from the source that they avoided armed conflict at this time. In-
stead of being engaged in war, the two sides agreed that King Samuel Aba would 
surrender the conquered land that had been occupied in 1030. And he would pay 
400 gold talentum (sc. unit of weight) as well as the same amount of fur cloaks as 
a gift. He assumed an obligation that King Stephen's wife Gisella would receive 
15 Oefele, Annales Altahenses Maiores, 32. Probably the duke was Béla who lived separate-
ly from his brothers Levente and András. Makk, Magyar külpolitika, 74. 
16 Gombos, Catalogus Fontium Históriáé, nr. 1143. 
17 Oefele, Annales Altahenses Maiores, 33. 
is SRH1: 329. 
19 Gy. Kristó-F. Makk-L. Szegfű, "Szempontok és adatok a korai magyar határvédelem 
kérdéséhez," [View points and data to the early Hungarian boundary defense] Hadtör-
ténelmi Közlemények 85:4 (1973), 639. 
20 Kristó-Makk-Szegfű, "Szempontok és adatok," 641. 
21 J. Doberdói Breit, A magyar nemzet hadtörténelme, [A military history of Hungary] Bu-
dapest 1929,3: 87-88. 
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everything back that was previously taken away from her by King Peter.22 We 
have two different comparisons of these serious points of peace. According to 
Rónai Horváth, Aba was not prepared for the battle, as he could hardly possess 
the gate of Moson and the line between Kapuvár and Abda. Furthermore, he 
could not set his army up behind the River Rába.23 The other opinion is by Breit. 
He figures that the German Emperor was not aware of the strength of the Hunga-
rian army. After he recognized the fact that he could only break through the 
Hungarian lines with great disadvantages, he preferred peace. Both of the opi-
nions seem valid, though after referring to the Hungarian chronicles and other 
details we can come to different conclusions. The contemporary definition of the 
frontier was not the same as now. It was much more fluid, so it was not too diffi-
cult for the king (Aba) to surrender the 'safety territory' of the Lajta-Fischa-
Morva region that had been conquered only 13 years earlier. We can prove from 
his later behavior that he considered it only temporary trouble and did not have 
to keep his original promise. He relied - maybe too much - on his royal power 
and the Hungarian defense line. The most important data from the year 1043 is 
the mention of using artificial defense in addition to the natural defenses. Accord-
ing to Wipo's and Hermann of Reichenau's report, the Hungarian swampy fron-
tier south from the Danube River was impenetrable. The Hungarian defenders 
benefited much from the knowledge that had been inherited from their ancestors 
about the local geography and climate. By the summer of 1044, Henry III recog-
nized that Aba would not want to keep his previous promise.24 Much was at 
stake to prepare for the battle and we can state that the king relied on his victory. 
We know many details about the affairs from both the Hungarian and the Ger-
man sources, so I need to mention the short definition of the chronicle researches. 
We know the German opinion from the contemporaneous Annals of Altaich. The 
Hungarian opinion is standing for the 'Chronicle composition' from the four-
teenth century but it originally comes from a perished gesta from the eleventh 
century. It is indisputable that the old Hungarian gesta consumed parts of the 
Annals of Altaich but did not counterfeit it. Finally these two opposing view-
points are equal with each other.25 The Annals of Altaich stresses: "King Henry III 
has taken only two sections of his army away with him, the Noric and Czech. He 
only mustered support though his guardians from the court by refusing them 
supplies because of the bad crops. He did this against many premonitions. While 
on his journey, he greeted some deputies of Aba who reclaimed the escapees... 
22 Oefele, Annales Altahenses Maiores, 33. Cf. SRH V. 329. 
23 J. Rónai Horváth, Magyar hadi krónika. Vol. 1, [Hungarian military chronicle] Budapest 
1895,36; Doberdói Breit, A magyar nemzet hadtörténelme, 45. 
24 Oefele, Annales Altahenses Maiores, 34. 
25 B. Hóman, A Szent László-kori Gesta Ungarorum és XII-XIII. századi leszármazói. [The Ges-
ta Ungarorum from the period of Saint Ladislas, and its descendants in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries] Budapest 1925, 81-87; L. I. Csóka, A latin nyelvű történeti irodalom 
kialakulása Magyarországon a XI-XV. században. [The birth and growth of the Latin-
written Hungarian historiography between the eleventh and fifteenth centuries] Buda-
pest 1967,348-351. 
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They tried to deter the king, but mostly to know the size of his army. They held 
back until the two armies were one day distant from each other. The people who 
urged peace also collected a huge company of their own. After all - even though 
both side of the opposition had members with placatory aims - they did not want 
to be unprepared. They agreed to fight three days later. On that day our hero ar-
rived at the agreed place, but the opponent was not there. He decided to chase 
them across the River Rába, so he searched for a passable way through the river. 
His guides were Hungarians who were taken from their country. They rode 
along shore all night until the rise of day when they got over the ford. As soon as 
it was realized that they were coming, the guides escaped and left their supplies 
behind. The way was open for ours and they filled up their stocks."26 This new 
information confirms that the disloyal Hungarians, friends of Peter, used their 
knowledge of the land to eliminate the defensive advantage and exposed the de-
ficiencies of the natural defense. The dormant passages were open. It is worth-
while to pay attention to some movements of cistern which mentions stagnant 
water (stagnantibus aquis) and defense works or fighting machines (machinis) 
which mean closeness by the usual method (more solito). This solution is frequent-
ly used in the gyepű-system. We can meet another frequent part of the defense 
system, the lurker deputy system. The Hungarian source Chronica Picta give us 
the line of the attack: " [Henry] pushed in at Sopron, but when he tried to cross at 
Babót near the River Rábca he could not do it because of the impenetrable ob-
structions: the flooding river, the chunky bush, and the swamp. The Hungarians 
who were loyal to Peter and the emperor rode all night up the riverside of the 
Rába and at the break of dawn crossed on a ford."27 The state soldiers trailed to 
Győr and on 5 July - by the reconstruction of Lajos Négyesi - clashed with Aba's 
stronger army between the present-day towns of Ménfő and Gyimót.28 The re-
searchers fully analyzed the events in all aspects several times. Andrea Kiss, for 
example has given us a detailed review of the weather conditions of the era.29 
I will only reflect on the part of the sources that mention a new defense factor. 
The Chronica Picta tells us about Henry who "with many soldiers, stood against 
King Aba near the town of Győr at Ménfő and believed in his victory because 
some of the Bavarians told them that the emperor had only a few soldiers. As it is 
said, King Aba would be the victor if some of the Hungarians did not refuse to 
fight because they were still in a friendship with King Peter."30 Fortunately, the 
king's Bavarian agents were part of the human department of the defense and 
they were sort of a 'detached post', a complementary intelligence service. Though 
they completed their tasks very well they did not have much influence on the 
26 Oefele, Annales Altahenses Maiores, 35-36. 
27 SRH1: 331. 
28 Négyesi, „A ménfői csata," 144; Oefele, Annales Altahenses Maiores, 36. 
29 A. Kiss, "Időjárási adatok a XI-XII. századi Magyarországról," [Weather records in 
Hungary in the eleventh-twelfth centuries] in „Magyaroknak eleiről." Ünnepi tanulmá-
nyok a hatvanesztendős Makk Ferenc tiszteletére, ed. F. Piti, Gy. Szabados, Szeged 2000, 
256-257. 
so SRH 1: 331. 
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outcome of the battle. On the contrary, the other group that stayed with Aba had 
a bigger influence on the conclusion. The secret unit of mavericks handicapped 
Aba by desertion. Many fighters died in the battle of Ménfő. It is understandable 
that the German annals tried to stress the Hungarians' loss and the Hungarian 
chronicle did the opposite. The latter told us a specific piece of information: "That 
day more Teutons died than could be counted. To this day, that location is named 
Ferlorum Payer by the Teutons and Vesztnempti by the Hungarians. At that time 
and place, soldiers had killed so many people, for two months humans could 
hardly cross the land because of the stink of the corpse and archers killed every-
body."31 (In order to protect the population against the epidemics because the 
battle was in the middle of the summer.) The defense was very efficient and effec-
tive and a summary of the incident can be found in the Chronica Picta. A view of 
this defense gives us very useful statistics. The light archers on horseback - the 
guardians of the gyepű - seemed to have regular point duty in contempt of anar-
chic policy. By the losing the battle - the first in the history of the Christian mo-
narchy - the country was open to the enemy and they advanced to the middle, to 
Székesfehérvár.32 The second overthrow of Peter was accelerated by the faith oath 
that was sent to Henry III in the Pentecost of 1045. Accordingly, general displea-
sure started that swept away his dominion; this was unacceptable both to the 
Christians and pagans. King Andrew I (1046-1060), a very positive king from the 
Árpád dynasty, was enthroned after Peter and Aba who were the grandnephews 
of Saint Stephen on their mother's side. Soon Andrew had to face the issue that 
the German emperor would not accept the loss of the loyalty oath easily. He 
called his brother Béla home in 1047 or 1048 and prepared for the attack by build-
ing up the castle Magyarbrod at the Czech-Hungarian border in 1049. The Bava-
rian answer was the building up of Hamburg.33 After the conflicts of the border 
in September 1051, Henry III attacked Hungary with his imperial forces. The 
Chronica Picta recalls the movement: „the emperor came to Hungary with his 
many warriors next to the streams of Zala and Zselic. He sent many ships with 
supplies to Hungary on the River Danube. The commander was his brother Bi-
shop Gebhard. King Andrew and Béla heard this and burned all the corn. The 
population and all of the animals were relocated far away where the emperor 
planned to adjourn. When the emperor entered Hungary and saw the burned 
lands, he could not find any supplies for his soldiers or for the horses. He did not 
even know where his ships were, so he could not get any supplies at all. Despite 
the hunger of his forces, they crossed the forests until they arrived at the moun-
tain of Bodajk. During this time, Bishop Gebhard arrived at Győr and sent a letter 
to Emperor Henry asking where he should wait for him."34 The offensive came in 
an unusual way and - what was brand-new - came from more ways. It is clear 
31 SRH1: 332-333. 
32 Oefele, Annales Altahenses Maiores, 37; SRH 1: 333. 
33 F. Makk, "Megjegyzések I. András történetéhez," [Remarks on history of King Andrew I] 
in F. Makk, A turulmadártól a kettőskeresztig. Szeged 1998,127-135. 
34 SRH 1: 347-348. 
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that Henry tried to avoid the Rába-Rábca gyepű and moreover his attack was a 
snap. He succeeded in reaching the middle of the country. He marched on to Bo-
dajk in Fejér County; however, Simon Kézai's statement that he assaulted Székes-
fehérvár for five months is not true.35 The only weak point of Conrad Ill's plan 
was the isolation of his army and the depletion of his supplies that occurred so 
soon. Gebhard's message was intercepted by Andrew's marauding soldiers and 
Bishop Michael counterfeited a letter in the name of the emperor with he used to 
recalled the fleet from the River Danube.36 Beside the cumulative experience they 
had further disadvantages. "Furthermore, the Hungarians and Pechenegs perse-
cuted them night and day and killed them with poisoned arrows. They kid-
napped many of them by flexing ropes beyond their tents... fearing the dangers 
the Teutons dug themselves into the ground and covered themselves with their 
shields laid next to the corps like in a tomb."37 As a legend of the fugitives in 
Chronica Picta we still name these mountains Vértes ('Shieldy'). Kézai uses the 
name Bársonyos ('Velvety') for the road from Bodajk to Győr as a way of remem-
bering the scattered pillows.38 We know the direction of the countermarch of the 
army from these two data. The German source the Annals of Altaich is quiet 
about their shame. The only thing what it mentions is that "the campaign against 
the Hungarians was totally unproductive and excruciating."39 The German army 
reached the line of Vértes where it met with the tactics of the burned land and the 
light cavalry archers who were able to kill them because the mass of troops in the 
staging area was mobile. In 1052 King Henry III attacked again. By experience of 
the previous year's failure, this time the fleet and the army traveled together. The 
reference section of the Chronica Picta shows us totally contrary conflicts as in the 
movements of 1051: "That time the king of the Teutons with his huge army 
seized the castle of Pozsony because... he demanded that the whole Hungarian 
country be under his thumb. He used many siege machines but he could not con-
quer the castle even with eight weeks attack. The mentioned king arrived with 
his fleet to assault the castle of Pozsony. The Hungarians found a very good 
swimmer called Zothmund who was sent to the fleet of the emperor in the mid-
dle of the night. He dove under the fleet and drilled holes in all the ships so that 
they what filled up with water. The power of the Teutons' declined and they re-
turned home. There were lots of knights in Pozsony but most notorious were 
Woytech, Endre, Vylungard, Urosa and Márton."40 The brave diver foiled the 
German venture by drilling. His courage distracts from the fact that the siege of 
Pozsony proceeded by the fighting rules of Western Europe. We know by the 
35 Ibid. 179. 
36 SRH 1: 348.; Some of the researchers think that bishop Miklós is the author of the gesta. 
J. Horváth, Árpád-kori latinnyelvű irodalmunk stílusprobiémái. [The style problems of the 
Latin literature in the Árpád period] Budapest 1954, 305-315. 
37 SRH 1:348-349. 
38 Ibid. 179-80; Kristó, Háborúk és hadviselés, 79. 
39 Oefele, Annales Altahenses Maiores, 47. 
40 SRH 1: 346-347; Annales Altahenses Maiores, 48. 
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names of the knights of the castle that they came from abroad so they used their 
own native experience during the defense of the castle. 
Pozsony's successful defense was the end of the eleventh century's German 
wars. After that time, King Andrew I, with brave and successful foreign policy, 
renovated the Hungarian-German relations as they were before 1024. Fortunate-
ly, King Henry Ill's sudden death helped him to arrange peace with the Ger-
mans.41 They signed the peace treaty in 1058 at the field of Morvamező and it was 
confirmed by the marriage of the Hungarian crown Prince Solomon and the 
German princess Judith. The effective result is mentioned with pettiness by Pope 
Leo IX's biographer. In his opinion the empire lost Hungary.42 After King Ste-
phen, Andrew was the first who could convince the Germans. The researchers 
mention him as Stephen's policy representative,43 though the previous opinion 
does not confirm that he noticed Stephen's policy because of the defeat of 
Ménfő.44 On the one hand, Aba Sámuel's generals were not suitable to his tactics. 
On the other hand the era's challenges have appeared in a brand new way and 
the defense tactics were brand new, too. 
In summary we can clearly find the human and physical elements of the de-
fense in the written sources. The natural element of the frontier defense is local 
knowledge which is given from the beginning and inherited from father to son. 
The rivers and swamps stopped the enemy, at least the River Rába did so. How-
ever, the Hungarians could empty all the supplies from the staging area in time 
and the power of the counter attack was able to conquer a piece of new land at 
the western boundary (1030). At the northern shore of the River Danube some 
tinhorn fortresses can be found (1042). At the River Rábca there are some works 
made by people (1043). Fighting machines and spy service can also be found. The 
gyepű system is only vulnerable if the enemy finds the soft spots of the local relief, 
however, the request for the fall back of the guards was given. The archers' qua-
rantine protected the population against the spread of the epidemics. (1044). The 
tactic of the burning the land can be used in a successful way in the middle of the 
country and completed with the attack of the cavalry archers (1051). Protectors to 
any siege of the castle of Pozsony were strong warriors and trained knights 
(1052). Cleverness can be found in bishop Miklós and the diver Zothmund. 
Finally, I would like to pay attention to the social importance of the burned 
land tactics in 1051 which was successful through hundreds of kilometers which 
shows us the mobility of the society that is the result of the eastern nomadic life-
style. Certainly, I do not want to say that the Hungarians lived the pure nomadic 
lifestyle in the 1050s because the Chronica Picta tells us about the farmers. The old 
traditions were fixed in the community's mind and still can be found in a travel 
book a hundred years later. In 1147 Bishop Otto of Freising has shown the coun-
41 Makk, Magyar külpolitika, 88-93. 
42 Gombos, Catalogus Fontium Históriáé, nr. 2466. 
43 Makk, A turulmadártól, 130. 
44 Rónai Horváth, Magyar hadi krónika, 41; Doberdói Breit A magyar nemzet hadtörténelme, 
80. 
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try this way: "they have only a few villages and towns, their houses are usually 
made of wood and reed and sometimes of stones. They live in tents during the 
whole summer and autumn."45 All these facts prove that the national defense-
organized by the Hungarian state-worked successfully, even in serious crisises. 
45 Gombos, Catalogus Fontium Historiae, nr. 1767. 
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